July 08-2019

TO: Supreme Court of PEI / Davies Law Courts / PO Box 2000 / Charlottetown, PE / C1A 7N8

ATTN: Prothonotary K. MacKay 

t. 902-368-6002  f. 902-368-0266   sent by mail


FROM: Roger Callow self-represented Plaintiff / 1285 Cahill Dr.E. #2001 / Ottawa, ON K1V 9A7

t/f: 613-521-1739  e-mail: rcallow770@gmail.com


To whom it may concern:

1) Letter from Prothonotary MacKay dated June 25-2019 received on July 03-2019 is included here:


(LETTERHEAD of Supreme Court of PE)

June 26, 2019

Roger Callow

1285  Cahill Drive West #2001

Ottawa, ON   K1V 9A7

Dear Mr. Callow:

Re:    Documents received by the Supreme  Court on June 25, 2019


I am in receipt of the documents and cheque that you have forwarded to the Supreme Court of PEI for filing. Unfortunately, we are not able to file these documents as they still do not comply with the requirements of the various Forms that you purport to file. You have  again combined a number of Forms into one  large document.  As  I stated in my previous letter to you, dated May 7, 2019, in order to be accepted for filing we would require that each Form be contained in its own  document. Your current document appears to contain a Statement of Claim, Notice of Motion and possibly Factum, and an Affidavit in one 11 page document.


We  must have each document provided as a separate document  in order for it to be filed, along with the fee for each document provided. I would direct your attention to Rules 14 and 25 regarding the Statement of Claim  and Rule 37 regarding motions. Please note that the different documents have different requirements for service and filing.


Consequently, I am returning your documents to you, along with your cheque  for filing fees. As you have previously been advised,  the cheque must  be  made payable to the "Supreme  Court of Prince Edward Island", so we could not have accepted your cheque even  if the documents had complied (with) the Rules of Court, since it was made payable to the "PEI Court of Queens  Bench Filing Fee".


Should you  have any questions regarding the foregoing, please contact me.


Yours very truly,

Krista J. MacKay, Q.C.


Supreme Court of Prince  Edward Island

/KJM  Enclosures


2) In reviewing the rules noted above, I include a proposal for PE Registry approval to proceed solely by Motion as disclosure is the underlining theme in this accusation of civil fraud which is paramount should the authorities wish to proceed on a criminal basis; an approach not available to private citizens. Such action would proceed in a venue other than PEI if effected.

3) If fraud is indeed to be shown, everything flowing from it is null and void. Employment would be returned to me with full compensation.

4) In fact, for 34 years this plaintiff has been unsuccessfully seeking disclosure from the Employer and Union in order to collect compensation in this unresolved case which has been hamstrung by over 50 judges across Canada in their bid to deny this plaintiff his rightful compensation be it under the collective bargaining rules, the imposed BILL 35 (B.C. 1985) or under any other legislation directed to employee compensation. Invariably, this request has been disposed of under the frivolous and vexatious legal terms claiming that this party is merely re-litigating earlier claims without being specific to which claims and how they were resolved. Justice Canada collapsed under that challenge with four denied appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada.

5) Once a file number has been assigned (assuming that my proposal to proceed by Motion alone is accepted by the court), I will await the response of the B.C. Union concerned. It should be noted that they have never appeared in any court hearing since the initial senior teacher lay-off in 1985. Reference under a Section 12 to the B.C. Labour Board was thwarted by that body. To date they do not file directly preferring to hide behind the Employer explaining why the Employer is not included in this action in PEI. The Employer's  conditions of disclosure are different from that of the Union.

6) A new cheque with the revisions requested from the Registry will follow an approved form.


Yours truly, (signed) Roger Callow



Jurisdiction of a Judge

37.02 (1) A judge of the court has jurisdiction to hear any motion in the proceeding

(C) Comment: The possible reference to matters of constitutional concern require a judge 37.04 & 37.14



37.03 (1) Unless the court otherwise orders, the place of hearing a motion on notice at a place named in the notice of motion.

(C) Davies Law Courts SIGS / General Proceedings / PO BOX 2000  42 Water Street / Charlottetown,

PE  C1A 7N8    t: 902-368-6000  f: 902-888-8222



37.05 (1) Where a motion is to be heard by a judge, a hearing date shall be obtained from the registrar before the notice of motion is served. (C) Late September or early October -2019. However, I would prefer everything to be conducted in writing with the said disclosure to be available beforehand as all else flows from that action. Indeed, in all likelihood under those circumstances, this plaintiff would depart from PE.



37.07 (1) The notice of motion and a copy of all material to be used on the motion shall be served on any party or other person who will be affected by the order sought unless the rules provide otherwise.

(C) As this action is confined to fraud on the part of the British Columbia Union concerned, there is to be no third party reference. The civil fraud charge laid against the Employer is being done in another venue  and entails an entirely different set of circumstances.



37.06  Every notice of motion (Form 37A) shall,

(a) state the precise relief sought; (C) disclosure of a specific document; meeting notes of West Vancouver School Trustees in June of 1985 where the lay-off of senior teacher, Roger Callow, was discussed. Those meeting notes were called by Justice Mary Southin in 1986 when she quashed the arbitration for failing to show a causal factor but later returned to the Employer and Union 'because she did not use them'. This party has been left in limbo as a consequence.

(b) state the grounds to be argued, including a reference to any statutory provision or rule to be relied on; and

(c) List the documentary evidence to be used at the hearing of the motion.


A)                                                                                            ORIGINATING DOCUMENT (MOTION)


(FORM 37A)










Roger Callow

1285 Cahill Drive

Ottawa, Ontario

K1V 9A7

tel/fax:  613-521-1739

e-mail: rcallow770@gmail.com                                                                     PLAINTIFF


West Vancouver Teacher Association School District #45

ATTN: Renee Willock - President

4915 Marine Drive

West Vancouver, B.C. V7W 2P5

tel: 604-926-1617   fax: 604-926-1119                                                           DEFENDANT


The enclosed material is sworn to as to its accuracy as an affidavit of the Plaintiff, Roger Callow,  dated this ____ th day of __________ of 2019.


(signed) Roger Callow


THE Plaintiff, Roger Callow will make a written motion to a judge on requesting the invocation of RULE 21.01 in which the production of the long sought-after disclosure would see an end to this unresolved  34 year B.C. labour case as far as P.E.I. courts are concerned.

Davies Law Courts SIGS

General Civil Proceedings

PO BOX 2000  42 Water Street

Charlottetown, PE C1A 7N8

tel: (902)368-6000  fax: (902) 888-8222

N.B. Preference, should the presiding Justice agree, would be given to a 'party by party' written argument although teleconferencing is a viable alternative all of which is permitted under the rules after  disclosure is produced as it defines all future action. Indeed, once I have disclosure, I will depart P.E.I.  Based on past experience, the Union never appears bowing to the Employer (sweetheart deal) to fight against disclosure which functions under different rules for a Union than an Employer. For that reason, the Employer is not included in this action here nor should the court make any attempt to divert this course by calling on them without first insisting on their copy of the disclosure. Further, the two accounts may not be the same.


To any Party on a Question of Law 21.01 (1) A party may move before a judge, (a) for the determination, before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or (2) No evidence is admissible on a motion, (a) under clause (1)(a), except with leave of a judge or on consent of the parties.


THE MOTION IS FOR: For the Union to produce 'disclosure'; a copy of the minutes of the June 1985 West Vancouver School Board meetings regarding the 'apparent' lay-off of senior teacher, Roger Callow, returned by Justice Mary Southin in the Appeal in 1986 because 'she did not use them'. The word 'apparent' is used because this lay-off remains untested in law hence for 34 years, the plaintiff has received no compensation including ongoing salary which belongs to him apart from judicial findings. Pension rights are also affected for 13 years now as the Employer refused to accept the plaintiff's retirement notice.


THE GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION ARE that there must be finality in law otherwise why have a justice system?  Hence the residual powers of the court are called into play. This action in P.E.I. is limited to disclosure after which I will have finished with P.E.I. courts.


THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE will be used at the written  (every oral hearing has been referred to oversight bodies due to malfeasance which never respond) hearing of the motion: Copious material in that regard is available on the plaintiff's web site employeescasecanada.ca. As to disclosure, the defendant Union is steadfast in refusing to produce these vital documents. Enclosures at this time are limited until I respond to the Union's factum should one appear.


B)                                                                                             AFFIDAVIT of FACTS

I, Roger Callow of the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, swear and affirm the following is true:

1. I turned 65 on August 24, 2006, which brought into play my pension rights;

2. My pension rights are determined on the basis of contributions to the plan, both mine and the employers;

3. The amount of these contributions is dependent on the date of termination of my employment;

4. Because I was a tenured teacher, my employment could only be determined by a proper legal process;

5. In my case the validity of the termination has never been determined. Technically although I was unable to work and was not paid, I remained a teacher under the employment of the School Board;

6.I require that a proper termination date be determined, or a settlement be achieved providing me compensation which would include pensionable service benefits. Currently, an ON Teachers' Pension(early B.C. plus ON)is being received

7. The pension inquiries caused me to examine how I could get compensation or a termination date determined considering that I was expelled from British Columbia in this unresolved legal matter for 'reasons best known to a judge' (Cullen Creed) in 2013.  There is no other remedy I can pursue other than as requested in this petition

8. Whatever approach is made, disclosure as outlined above is at the root of any successful remedy.


AFFIRMED : in the Province of Ontario (Ottawa) on  JULY ___, 2019


Roger Callow (signed) Plaintiff



1) When Justice Mary Southin quashed the arbitration favouring the West Vancouver School Board in 1986 labeling , as she did, the arbitrator to be 'patently unreasonable', I was left in limbo when the School Board did not return employment as she recommended. Nor did the Board return to re-arbitration as she subsequently ordered. Nor did she order me back on salary until a resolution was found.


2) In her enquiry, Southin j. called for all meeting notes from the Board in the month of May-June 1985 dealing with my lay-off and BILL 35. She later returned these notes to the Employer and Union 'because she did not use them'. That is what is described here as the 'secret missing memo notes' which were conspicuous by their absence in 2004 when I requested such material under the 'access' laws from the School Board.


3) What is submitted here is that the major reason as to why Southin j. quashed the arbitration is that Board personnel and their lawyer committed perjury. For example, she noted that 'nowhere did the Board show an intention to lay-off a teacher in June of 1985' thus putting the lie to the Superintendent's lay-off letter quoting that authority. At this point, it appears that the Board Motion sanctioning the lay-off in evidence at the arbitration was written by the Harris & Co. lawyer  'after the fact' when it was realized a challenge was to be made against this precipitate action. In short, with this allegation, Justice Southin (r. 2004) would be guilty of cover-up if not something far more serious.


4) The many attempts by this plaintiff  to acquire this disclosure has led to a cover-up of the cover-up where the very essence of the credibility of the justice system is at stake explaining currently why Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been called on to exert executive action including an RCMP seizure of these records. (N.B. Dec. 27-2016; no subsequent action to date July 08-2019)


5) Of course it would be much easier if the B.C. teachers at large directed their Union leaders to divulge this disclosure making such as this legal proceeding unnecessary.


BACKGROUND (B)  focus: Bruce Laughton QC legal counsel for the Union since 1986


6) When the original lawyer , Allan Black, appointed by the Union with my agreement lost the arbitration, I switched lawyers to Harry Rankin (d.) who was unsuccessful in getting Southin j. to either return my teaching career or place me back on salary until this legal matter was resolved. He failed on both accounts.


7) I next obtained the services of Labour specialist, Leo McGrady who also failed to get Southin j. to change her mind specifically into appointing a new arbitrator. The Union paid for all legal services to that point. In the interim, the arbitrator died creating a 'frustrated' situation; a legal term in which litigants are not to be held responsible for  'glitches' in the law.


8) Black, the original Union lawyer for the arbitration made a pre-announcement that in the event of any conflict between myself and the Union; he would drop out and not represent either side. As McGrady was hired by me, his loyalty should have been to me in providing disclosure which he did not do before he dropped out on a technicality.


9) Unfortunately, Mr. Laughton  claimed to solely represent the Union against my wishes after he had been dismissed; a position he has maintained up to the current time. Over the years, he has even seen fit to join with the Employer to frustrate my legal attempts to get justice being abetted by the legal department of the B.C. Teachers Federation in that regard. That collaboration led to a charge of fraudulent activities (Federal Court T-2360-14 which was refiled in Quebec  and was part of a Supreme Court of Canada 'unheard' challenge 36883 QC). To the best of my knowledge, he never met with his purported representative, the West Vancouver Teachers Association preferring to deal solely with the BCTF legal department.


10) Part of the conspiracy charge against Mr. Laughton is that he handled the Appeal of Justice Southin after I had dismissed Rankin & Co. and hired Leo McGrady. If the Employer is to be believed, the Union had no role in this hearing hence their presence was gratuitous and dependent on my personal agreement which they never had. Indeed, if I was part of the Appeal Court process, I would have been privy to the disclosure that I am now seeking and hence the 34 year kafkaesque search including this one in P.E.I. would be redundant.


11) I believe that it is important for the court to be aware of this background with Mr. Laughton as there is a good chance he will seek to represent the Union from B.C. in my request for solely a written response. Ideally speaking, local P.E.I. representation would be preferred as they are bound by P.E.I. legal practices and not B.C.




12) That this court order the Union to produce the above mentioned disclosure making use of the RCMP if required as no hearing on any level can make legal sense without this necessary acquisition.




13) In September of 2010, I laid CA038538 in B.C. Appeal Court requesting the courts permission to proceed due to earlier prohibition orders. In October, 2010, Deputy Justice A. McKenzie, on her own volition and for reasons best known to herself, without taking legal argument, nor quoting pertinent laws, dropped this case from the docket. I could only continue with the 'permission of a judge' which I claimed I had already done in this contradictory order.


14) It was clear that I was faced with a 'sweetheart deal' between Union and Employer as supported by the courts with their claim that only the Union could represent me in legalities. My reaction was to say, fine, let the courts battle things out with the other two while I am placed back on salary until a judicial resolution was found. After all, this salary was 'deferred earnings' as I should never have been cut from salary until this matter was resolved in the first place. No doubt fearing a potential third trip to the Supreme Court of Canada, it is submitted here, is what produced this spurious 'McKenzie Creed'.


15) By the summer of 2013, the B.C. Appeal Court was obviously fed up with my attempts to get judicial approval to proceed, so Deputy Chief Justice Cullen ('Cullen Creed') expelled me from B.C. Courts 'for reasons best known to himself' with no such permission to proceed under any circumstances. That Creed can be found on the web site employeescasecanada.ca and can be included here should the court deem this information pertinent.


16) The mammoth failure of all courts outside B.C. - Federal Court, Ontario Courts, Quebec Courts, Saskatchewan Courts, Nova Scotia Courts - and hopefully not P.E.I. courts to acknowledge that simple fact reflected in the 'Cullen Creed' makes a dead-end argument of any legal point related to such as Inherent jurisdiction, natural justice, transference, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, habeas corpus. Filibustering on that point alone has drawn the very efficacy of the credibility of the Canadian Justice System into question without which there can be no democracy.


17) Underlying the jurisdictional disputes is the disclosure requested above as, it is submitted here, those records introduce an entirely new phase to this case by initiating criminal fraud charges (outside of P.E. I. Courts).


8) The nature of this case vis a vis imposed legislation (Carbon Tax) which the Green Party and Premier King decided to apparently 'pass on' in receiving my assistance is noted here. (SK Premier Moe also ignored similar warnings ... I was laid off under the imposed BILL 35 -1985 B.C.)




19) Premier King and the courts should be on the lookout for specious 'Motions to Dismiss' ; false surety bids and 'stay of proceedings'; fraudulent 'frivolous & vexatious' material; copious precedent cases none of which deal with an unresolved legal issue from a court outside of such as PEI; and perverted Registry actions. All these stunts are reflective of the penetration of the back door of the Chief Justice in courts across Canada by the 'grey eminence'. The presence of Bruce Laughton QC, should the Union retain his services in PEI, is highly suspicious as noted elsewhere.


20) Due to the collapse of Justice Canada under the subterfuge of the Employee's Case, Governor General Payette is the stand-in for all referencing in this case in which she is invited to keep the U.S. President cognizant of the above threat as it relates to commercial and diplomatic dealings for international interests.


(signed) Roger Callow  Plaintiff


cc GG  Payette / Premier King / U.S. interests



HEARINGS IN ABSENCE OF PUBLIC  Consent Motions, Unopposed Motions and Motions Without Notice


37.11  (1) Where a motion is on consent, unopposed or without notice under subrule 37.07(2), the motion may be heard in writing without the attendance of the parties, unless the court orders otherwise. (C) writing preferred




37.14 (1) Where a proceeding involves complicated issues or where there are two or more proceedings in a court that involve similar issues, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or a judge designated by him, may direct that all motions in the proceeding or proceedings be heard by a particular judge. (C) This is the key to this legal matter as all presiding justices to date lack the necessary constitutional qualifications as they relate to imposed legislation (B.C.'s imposed BILL 35  1985) which is the only document the Employer quotes to justify their actions of doing nothing although they do not explain, nor has any court forced them to explain, why compensation has not been paid under the conditions of BILL 35, presuming that is the operant document in this labour matter? In brief, every employer will gerrymander in future to have all labour legislation to be imposed which is tantamount to anarchy in democratic Canada. That is why a copy of all correspondence on this matter goes to the Governor General of Canada as 'the last person standing'.


Yours truly,


Roger Callow  Plaintiff 

July 08-2019


cc Governor General J. Payette